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After Simondon Series Preface
Thanks largely to the works of philosophers who are inspired by 
him, most notably Gilles Deleuze and Bernard Stiegler, the name 
Gilbert Simondon is becoming more and more familiar to readers 
outside France. Up to the time of writing this preface, however, 
few of his works have been translated into English. It is almost 
an irony that we call this book series After Simondon, dedicated 
as it is to a thinker who is not yet fully available to his readers. 
However, After Simondon does not mean to overtake Simondon 
by declaring his thought obsolete, but rather to address him as 
our contemporary. Indeed, there are challenging contemporary 
issues that Simondon did not and could not address in his time, 
yet which his thought retains the power to interrogate, problem-
atize, critique and illuminate.
This book series traces the implications as well as the critiques of 
Simondon’s thought. It aims to go one step further than simply 
resituating Simondon as a neglected great twentieth­century phi-
losopher of technology. Simondon was not merely a philosopher 
of technology but rather one whose ambition was nothing less 
than to rewrite the history of philosophy according to the concept 
of individuation and to invent a philosophical thinking that could 
effectively integrate technology into culture. After Simondon thus 
poses the question: What could critical thinking and theory con-
cerning technology and individuation be after Simondon—that is, 
both following Simondon but also going beyond him and trans-
gressing his thought?
We contend that Simondon’s concepts and observations could 
serve as a rich source for the development of new concepts, 
theories and practices for coping with our contemporary con-
dition. This includes a wide range of topics from digital objects 
and techno- and media-ecologies to what might be called 
a ‘technological humanism’; from individuation, inventions 
and imaginations to perceptions; from animals to technical 
systems; and from issues of the automatic and alienation in the 
10 twenty­first century to the process of cyberneticization. We hope 
that this series can act as a continuation of Simondon’s projects, 
and we welcome proposals from scholars who are working on 
such subjects in relation to Simondon’s thought.
    Erich Hörl and Yuk Hui  
    Summer, 2015
Author's Preface to the English Translation
The texts brought together here were first published in French 
in two contributed volumes, edited respectively by Jean­Claude 
Ameisen and Laurent Cherlonneix, and by the late Jean­Marie 
Vaysse.1 Erich Hörl and Yuk Hui had the idea of selecting these 
two texts to inaugurate the series After Simondon, and I thank 
them warmly for this. My aim is to provide the reader with a rigor-
ous presentation of some of Simondon’s key ideas, along with 
some developments that we can today bring to them. 
Indeed, these two texts share a double ambition. On the one 
hand, to analyse the general—and in my view the most pro-
found—logic of what I refer to in my work as Simondon’s “genetic 
encyclopaedism.” And, on the other, to lead beyond Simondon, 
in the direction of that comprehensive but open (because anti­
dogmatic) system on which I am working at the moment, and for 
which the concluding part of the second text establishes some 
strictly architectonic principles. In this respect, I would like to con-
gratulate Barnaby Norman for his work of translation. Philo-
sophical language is, we say in French, “a language in a language 
[une langue dans une langue],” and Barnaby Norman was able to 
convey this philosophical language into the English version. 
1 Jean­Claude Ameisen and Laurent Cherlonneix, eds., Nouvelles représenta-
tions de la vie en biologie et philosophie du vivant [New Representations of Life 
in Biology and the Philosophy of the Living Being] (Brussels: De Boeck, 2013); 
Jean-Marie Vaysse, ed., Technique, monde, individuation: Heidegger, Simondon, 
Deleuze [Technics, Life, Individuation: Heidegger, Simondon, Deleuze] 
(Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2006).
Aspects of a Philosophy 
of the Living
As I often do, I am going to try to explore here the theoretical 
potentialities, and hence the possible currency, of Gilbert Simon-
don’s (1924–1989) work. To speak of potentialities is of course to 
recognize that Simondon did not conceptualize the simple intui-
tions that were his. Particularly since his texts very often seem to 
draw on philosophical theories (on the living being, the theories 
of Canguilhem and Bergson, and sometimes even Nietzsche) and 
scientific theories (on the living being, Simondon cites Rabaud) 
that are difficult to square with what, thanks to scientific prog-
ress, we know today of the various realities about which these 
theories made their assertions. But beside the fact that the goals 
Simondon had in mind when he ventured into this territory may 
themselves seem very topical—such as his intention to challenge 
the “anthropological break” too often accepted by philosophers 
in the name of what is “proper to the human being”—it must 
also be noted that the tensions found in Simondon’s text come 
from the presence, alongside a superseded theoretical her-
itage, of genuine idiosyncratic intuitions which may themselves 
be conceptualized today. This is particularly true, as we will see, 
16 for his precursory and incomplete questioning of the concept of 
“information,” which he argued from very early on would become 
central, and whose theoretical inadequacy he at the same time 
denounced—pre-empting on this second point the more recent 
reflections of Henri Atlan, who now makes reference to him.1
If, therefore, his work is today enjoying a resurgence of inter-
est, even internationally, it is because his questioning and his 
intuitions have a possible currency, whose force and extension I 
have been attempting to expose for ten years.2 To the subject of 
the living being, along with the non­living and psycho-social life, 
Simondon brings a mode of questioning that does not exactly 
belong to his epoch, but whose initial strangeness makes more 
sense today.
The Positioning of the Thinking of the 
Living Being at the Centre of Genetic 
Encyclopedism 
For Simondon, the living being is simultaneously:
– the object that is the most difficult to think; and
– the theme that contains the hidden unity of his work, even 
beyond that first surface unity presented by the theme of 
individuation, which is actually transversal for him.
1 Henri Atlan, Le vivant post-génomique, ou Qu’est-ce que l’auto-organisation? 
[Post­Genomic Living, or What is Auto­Organization?] (Paris: Odile Jacob, 
2011). There will be an opportunity to talk about Atlan’s Simondonian 
evolution below.
2 On the encyclopedic aspect of Simondon’s approach, I refer to my overview 
of Simondon’s work Simondon ou L’Encyclopédisme génétique (Paris: PUF, 
2008). For a more technical examination of questions specifically connected 
with the living being, see Chapter IV of my book Penser l’individuation: 
Simondon et la philosophie de la nature (Paris: L’Hartmattan, 2005), as well 
as the two articles cited below by Anne Fagot-Largeault and Victor Petit. 
Simondon’s thinking of the living being has received very little commentary, 
but these two articles are some of the best available in the field of exegetic 
work on Simondon’s thought in general.
17These are the two general points that I would like to quickly 
clarify by way of introduction to the more specific questions con-
cerning biological theory that will be at issue in what follows.
First, then, the living being is the object that is the most difficult 
to think for Simondon. This is to be understood in two senses: 
a sense indicating an objective situation that Simondon lived 
through but did not think, and a sense that belongs to Simon-
don’s own thought. So, on the one hand, Simondon lived through 
the objective situation of the biology of his epoch: in 1957, the 
year in which his crucial theoretical effort drew to a close,3 the 
impermeability of the germ cell had of course been known about 
for more than half a century, but the double helix structure of 
DNA had only been known to biologists for four years—Simondon 
for his part only mentions Gesell’s citation of “Wrinch’s theory 
according to which the chromosome is a structure composed of 
two elements”4—and Crick was still several months off setting 
out what he would refer to as “the central dogma of molecular 
biology,” which is to say, that the sense of genetic expression is 
univocal and that each gene has a corresponding transcript and 
protein. In France more than elsewhere, the debate between 
the neo­Darwinism deriving from August Weismann and neo-
Lamarckism—which is to say between a more subtle Lamarckism 
and a Darwinism that was less Lamarckian than Darwin!5 —was 
3 In L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, which 
was his main thesis for the doctorat d’Etat, supervised by Jean Hyppolite. 
Two works developed out of it, L’individu et sa genèse physico-biologique 
(Grenoble: Millon, 1995) (with a first incomplete edition published by PUF in 
1964) and L’individuation psychique et collective (Paris: Aubier, 1989). The clas-
sic work Du mode d’existence des objets techniques (Paris, Aubier, 1958) was his 
secondary thesis.
4 Gilbert Simondon, L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’infor-
mation, 207.
5 It gives me pleasure to recall here what Jean Gayon said about Darwin at 
the end of his famous study: “As for his theory of heredity, it was in general 
extremely obscure, and when it was clear, it was a manifesto for a an 
extreme form of the heredity of acquired characteristics” (Darwin et l’après-
Darwin [Kimé, Paris: 1992], 411). 
18 still going strong. Simondon made reference to Darwin and 
Lamarck, but in order to discuss their respective concepts of 
“adaptation” in remarks dedicated to the philosophical presup-
positions of the biological debate, remarks which therefore 
remained relatively exterior to contemporary discussions on the 
innate and the acquired, with these two notions barely making 
an appearance in his text. For all that, it is possible to argue, with 
Anne Fagot-Largeault, that Simondon’s position represents the 
invention of a “technical neo-Lamarckism,”6 to the extent that 
Simondon wanted to think the living being such that it engenders 
technics and such that it defines (via the “process of hominization” 
that is the human being for Leroi-Gourhan) an inherited technical 
world which appeals to our various potentials—which, moreover, 
are inextricably individual and collective at the psycho-social level 
of the living beings that we are.
On the other hand, Simondon’s thought itself makes the living 
being the object that is the most difficult to think: being a second 
“order of individuation” after the physical order, the living being is 
not, for all that, a substantial domain which would vindicate vital-
ism. Simondon, like Georges Canguilheim, draws here on Claude 
Bernard’s theoretical position from the Introduction à l’étude de 
la médecine expérimentale [Introduction to the Study of Exper-
imental Medicine], a position—not however theorized as such by 
Bernard, who was relatively unconcerned in this respect—which 
6 Anne Fagot­Largeault, “L’Individuation en biologie,” in Bibliothèque du 
Collège international de philosophie, Gilbert Simondon: Une pensée de 
l’individuation et de la technique (Paris: Albin Michel, 1994) (my emphasis). 
Here applied to Simondon, the expression is taken by Fagot­Largeault from 
M. Tibon-Cornillot, whose article she cites, “Penser en amont de la bio-
éthique: transformations dirigées du génome et crise du néodarwinisme,” in 
Vers un anti-destin? Patrimoine génétique et droits de l’humanité, ed. François 
Gros and Gérard Huber (Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1992), 127–46. The idea of 
a specifically technical neo­Lamarckism has been developed—in extremely 
complex ways which I have discussed elsewhere—by Bernard Stiegler in the 
three volumes of La Technique et le Temps published to date (Paris: Galilée, 
1994, 1996 and 2001).
19overcomes the opposition between mechanism and vitalism.7 The 
inherent difficulty of this enterprise—avoiding mechanism with-
out then falling back into vitalism—is heightened by the fact that, 
for Simondon, the living being must be thought of as that which 
makes possible a third order of individuation, simultaneously inter-
nal to the living being itself while extending and exceeding it: the 
psycho­social or “transindividual” order of individuation. Vitalism 
is in fact even harder to avoid when your intention is to make the 
living being something that is capable of becoming psycho-social. 
But this intention is the necessary counterpart to the intention, 
central to Simondon’s work, of thinking man himself as a living 
being. We will see that it is not possible to understand Simon-
don’s discussion of the living being without seeing it in the light of 
this exigency: to make culture emerge from nature itself. Further, 
it will become evident that Simondon balances the “vitalist risk” 
inherent to the way he would like to understand the genesis of 
the psycho­social with the symmetrical ambition of deriving the 
living from that which is not living. Such a compensation will, how-
ever, produce the extreme theoretical difficulty of a “great division,” 
which will nevertheless necessarily define Simondon’s undertaking, 
itself necessary, as the non-scientific—because philosophical—uni-
fication of the sciences, which in fact lack unity.
We come now to the second of the general points—the theme of 
the living being contains the hidden unity of Simondon’s work, 
even beyond that first surface unity presented by the transversal 
theme of individuation. Indeed, the two essential works, L’individ-
uation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information [Individua-
tion in the Light of the Notions of Form and Information] and Du 
mode d’existence des objets techniques [On the Mode of Existence 
7 Discussion of this theoretical position taken by Claude Bernard, as well as 
the un­theorized tension it produces between the first two of the three parts 
of his major work, can be found in François Dagognet’s very lucid preface to 
Introduction à l’étude de la médecine expérimentale (Paris: Flammaron, 1984).
20 of Technical Objects]8 do not only complement one another at the 
heart of a “Genetic Encyclopedism” (this being what this philos-
ophy is called) which aims to think the individuation of physical, 
vital, psycho­social and technical beings. They are also articulated 
with each other within a constant dialogue with cybernetics, 
whose tendency to reduce the living being to technical schemas 
is criticized by Simondon. For Simondon, it is instead a matter of 
thinking the “concretization” of technical objects as an “individ-
ualization” for which the living being provides the model, which 
is only ever approached by the technical object in its relation 
with its “associated milieu.” If, therefore, there are for Simondon 
“phylogenetic lineages” of technical objects, the analogy between 
the living being and the machine is not for all that an assimilation 
of the first to the second, and the machine is only made possible 
as something that functions because it is itself the work [œuvre] of 
a living being. So, Simondon’s thought finds its general structure 
in an analogy which is not an identity between the technical and 
the living.
Now, the theme of “individualization” which Simondon transfers 
from a thinking of the living to a thinking of the technical object 
will at the same time provide the major idea of his thinking of the 
living being, insofar as individualization, as distinguished from 
what Simondon refers to as “individuation,” is not only a genesis, 
but a continual genesis. This is in fact a possible first definition 
of life: the living, as distinguished from the physical, maintains 
its own becoming in terms of an individuation understood as a 
genesis. I will need to clarify this before coming by this route to 
the question of “adaptation,” and then, by way of the question of 
information, to its possible relation to the question of apoptosis.
8 We know that it is through Du mode d’existence des objets techniques that 
Simondon became well known, but it is also through this work that he is mis-
takenly reduced to the status of a thinker of technics.
21Individuation and Individualization: Life as 
Continual Genesis
I said that Simondon’s thinking of the living being only makes 
sense in the light of his central challenge to the philosophers’ 
“anthropological break.” It is because the human being must 
be understood as a living being that life must be understood as 
potentially the bearer of a psycho-social becoming. This is the 
meaning of this strange formula, used by Simondon to denounce 
the philosophers’ procedure: “you certainly cannot make the 
human being emerge from the vital if you extract the Human 
Being from the vital.”9 Mechanism, when applied to the living 
being, serves the interests of an initial anthropocentrism, which 
it is a question of challenging by returning to the living its ability 
to engender the human being and his spirituality. This double 
theoretical move is certainly not completely obligatory—you 
find theoreticians today, often biologists, who think the human 
being starting from the living being without, for all that, retaining 
the requirement of then making life capable of spirituality: for 
them, the “psycho-social” is nothing but an epiphenomenon, and 
humanity’s most significant achievements only expressions of 
the struggle for survival! It is not by chance that Simondon was 
so interested in ethology. Ethologists, as specialists in animal 
behavior and its psychic dimension, are in fact best placed to 
challenge the cultural application of Darwinism, as the great 
ethologist Frans de Waal has done in his overview of the subject, 
L’Âge de l’empathie [The Age of Empathy].10
And yet I also emphasized that Simondon seeks to avoid a fall 
back into vitalism. How does he do it? By thinking human individ-
ualization as a “personalization” placed above two initial forms 
of individualization of the living being, themselves rooted in a 
9 Simondon, L’individuation psychique et collective, 181, and L’individuation à la 
lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 297.
10 Frans de Waal, The Age of Empathy (New York: Random House, 2009).
22 “polarization,” whose first order is physical. Let’s look at what this 
means.
Simondon, like Jean Piaget later in Biologie et connaissance 
[Biology and Knowledge],11 does not want to separate the thinking 
of the relationship between the living being and its milieu from 
a theory of knowledge, which he in fact seeks to rework so 
that knowledge is made into a complex form of adaptation of 
the living being understood as a “subject.” More broadly still, 
we should be able to think what in On the Mode of Existence of 
Technical Objects he will refer to as “phases of culture”—technics, 
religion, art, science, etc.—as extending and complicating, 
through the play of interlacements, the tri­dimensional division 
of the living animal into “action,” “perception,” and “emotion.” 
Thus, for example, “science is technical perception”:12 science and 
perception are both “psycho-somatic,” adds Simondon, but the 
body of science is, one might say, technically decentered—while 
its psyche is socially decentered. So, this decentering, which is 
explicitly thought by Piaget, is what, for Simondon, “properly 
responds to a new engagement”13 of the subject in the world: 
between perception and science there is both continuity and 
discontinuity.
This is why the living must be thought on the one hand as a contin-
ual individuation which, on the other hand and precisely because 
of this, holds in reserve the surprise of its own overcoming. So, 
what Simondon refers to as “individualization” is simultaneously:
11 Jean Piaget, Biologie et connaissance (Paris: Gallimard, 1967). On the sim-
ilarities as well as the differences between the approaches of Simondon 
and Piaget, see Victor Petit, “L’individuation du vivant (2). Génétique et 
ontogenèse,” in Cahiers Simondon no. 2 (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2010), 53–80.
12 Simondon, L’individuation psychique et collective, 140, and L’individuation à la 
lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 271.
13 Simondon, L’individuation psychique et collective, 140, and L’individuation à la 
lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 271.
23– this permanent individuation of the living being, which is a 
“theater of individuation” and not only a “result of individ-
uation” or of genesis;
– the somato-psychic redoubling of animal life, an ensemble of 
“sub­individuations” through which it becomes clear that “it is 
the psycho­somatic that is the model of the living being”;14 and
– what prepares, by creating the bio­psychic “subject,” the con-
ditions for psycho­social or “transindividual” individuation in 
which “personality” comes about.
Now, the strange idea, central to these three points, according 
to which the psycho­somatic is “the model of the living being,” 
derives only from the Simondonian requirement that the living 
being be accounted for in its becoming—which takes it right up 
to the psycho-social—and it does not, therefore, lead Simondon 
to a vitalism that would cut the living being off from its pre­vital 
conditions. This is attested by the hypothesis of the distinct 
“orders” (the physical and the living) of the one same phenome-
non of polarization: “we are in need of a systematic theory of 
polarization which would certainly further clarify the relations 
between what we call living matter (or organized matter) and 
inert or inorganic matter.”15 Simondon himself sketches out this 
theory of polarization, in the first place differentiating within the 
same phenomenon of polarization vital individuation from the 
individuation of the polarized crystal in formation:
In the physical sphere, internal resonance characterizes the 
limit of the individual individuating itself; in the sphere of the 
living being, it becomes the criterion of the entire individual 
as individual; it exists in the individual’s system and not only 
in the system that the individual forms with its milieu; the 
internal structure of the organism does not only result (as is 
14 Simondon, L’individuation psychique et collective, 140, and L’individuation à la 
lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 271.
15 Simondon, L’individuation et sa genèse physico-biologique, 201, and L’individ-
uation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 203.
24 the case with crystal) from the activity taking place and the 
modulation happening at the limit between the spheres of 
interiority and exteriority; the physical individual, forever 
de­centered, forever peripheral to itself, active at the limit 
of its domain, has no true interiority; the living individual on 
the other hand does have a true interiority, because individ-
uation happens on the inside; for the living individual, the 
interior is also constitutive, while for the physical individual 
only the limit is constitutive and what is topologically interior 
is genetically anterior. The living individual is contemporary 
with itself in each of its elements, which is not the case with 
the physical individual, which contains some past radically 
past, even when it is growing. Inside itself, the living being 
is an informational communication hub; it is a system in 
a system, comprising in itself the mediation between two 
orders of magnitude.16
Two comments on what Simondon says here:
Firstly, the difference indicated here between what Simondon will 
later call the “chrono­topology” of physical individuation (where 
what is “topologically interior” is “genetically anterior”) and the 
chrono­topology of vital individuation (where the interior belongs 
to the present rather than the past), also coordinates with the 
Simondonian hypothesis of a topological—which here is to say 
geometric—peculiarity of the living being: “Nothing demonstrates 
to us that we could adequately think the living being through 
Euclidian relationships.” This hypothesized geometric peculiarity 
of the living being is “topological” for Simondon according to a 
non-Euclidian understanding of “topology”: “living individuation 
must be thought according to topological schemas. Indeed, it is 
16 Simondon, L’individuation et sa genèse physico-biologique, 26, and L’individ-
uation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 28.
25by way of these topological structures that the spatial problems 
of the organism in evolution can be resolved.”17
Secondly, attributing “true interiority” to the living individual is 
not the same as making it substantial—fighting against sub-
stantialism even being the whole point of Simondon’s thinking of 
individuation.18 Consequently, with respect to this interiority of 
the living being, Simondon clarifies:
An immediate belief in the interiority of the being as individ-
ual comes, no doubt, from the intuition of one’s body [corps 
propre] which seems, from the position of a thinking man, to 
be separated from the world by a material envelope which 
has a certain consistence and defines an enclosed space. In 
fact, a relatively deep psycho­biological analysis would show 
that, for a living being, the relation to the external environ-
ment is not distributed only at its external surface. The 
notion of the interior milieu, developed by Claude Bernard 
for the requirements of biological investigation, shows well 
enough through the mediation it establishes between the 
exterior milieu and the being, that the substantiality of the 
being should not be confused with its interiority, even in the 
case of the biological individual.19
The notion of polarization certainly represents Simondon’s 
true Canguilhemian heritage,20 and accordingly it responds to 
Canguilhem’s fundamental philosophical interrogations: “In what 
is called a cell, it is biological individuality that is at issue. Is the 
individual a reality? An illusion? An ideal? No one science, not 
even biology, can answer this. And if all the sciences can and 
must make their contribution to this elucidation, it is doubt-
17 Simondon, L’individuation et sa genèse physico-biologique, 225, and L’individ-
uation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 227.
18 On this point, see my Simondon ou l’Encyclopédisme génétique, 9–19.
19 Simondon, L’individuation et sa genèse physico-biologique, 125, and L’individ-
uation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 127.
20 On this point we refer to Canguilhem’s classic work, Le normal et le patholo-
gique (Paris: PUF, 1966).
26 ful that the problem is properly scientific in the usual sense of 
the term.”21 After these words, Canguilhem adds the following 
remark as a note in the second edition of La connaissance de la vie 
[Knowledge of Life]: “Since these lines were written, Mr. Gilbert 
Simondon’s thesis L’individu et sa genèse physico-biologique [The 
Individual and its Physico­biological genesis] (Paris: PUF, 1964) has 
thankfully contributed to the elucidation of these questions.”22 
Indeed, as I have shown elsewhere in an extension of an article by 
Dominique Lecourt,23 the question of knowing where individuality 
is situated—in the cell or the organism—is no longer pertinent 
for Simondon. This is because, from the inert molecule to the 
transindividualized personality, passing by cell and organism, we 
are in every case faced with increasing degrees of an individuality 
which is only ever a result of individuation:
Strictly speaking, we cannot speak of the individual, but only 
of individuation; we must get back to the activity, to genesis, 
rather than trying to grasp the already given being in order 
to discover the criteria by which we can know whether or not 
it is an individual. The individual is not a being but an act, and 
being is an individual as the agent of this act of individuation 
by which it shows itself and exists. Individuality is an aspect 
of generation, is explained by the genesis of a being, and 
consists in the perpetuation of this genesis.24
21 Canguilhem, La connaissance de la vie, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1969), 78 (author’s 
emphasis). We find an echo of these words today in Alain Prochiantz’s dis-
course on properly vital individuation: “[vital] individuation is a process 
without end, but also without purpose, whose comprehension draws on 
all fields of knowledge, including non­scientific disciplines, even if it falls to 
biologists alone to elucidate its mechanisms and conditions of existence” 
(Machine-esprit [Paris: Odile Jacob, 2001], 168–69).
22 Georges Canguilhem, La connaissance de la vie, 78.
23 See Dominique Lecourt, “La question de l’individu d’après George Can-
guilhem,” in Bibliothèque du Collège international de philosophie, Georges 
Canguilhem, philosophe, historien des sciences (Paris: Albin Michel, 1993); see 
also my Simondon ou l’Encyclopédisme génétique, 17–19.
24 Simondon, L’individuation et sa genèse physico-biologique, 189, and L’individ-
uation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 191.
27At which point we come back, via the concept of individuality, to 
individualization, the first meaning of which was this “continu-
ation of genesis,” or continual individuation. We now understand 
that, for each level of individuality, there is a corresponding level 
of complexity of polarization: the polarization of the affectivity of 
the bio­psychic animal “subject” is not the same as the polari-
zation of the cellular membrane, which is not the same as the 
undergoing of individuation of the crystal.
The Problem of Adaptation
The process of vital individuation described by Simondon will 
bring him to criticize, even if allusively, what he calls the “biolo-
gism of adaptation.” The criticism is primarily aimed at Darwin, 
but Lamarck will also be targeted:
Adaptation is correlative with individuation; it is only pos-
sible in accordance with individuation. All biologism of 
adaptation, which is the basis for an important aspect of 
nineteenth-century philosophy, and which has come down 
to us in pragmatism, presupposes the already individuated 
living being as implicitly given; the processes of growth are 
partially left aside; it is a biologism without ontogenesis. The 
concept of adaptation in biology represents the projection 
of the relational schema of thought with an obscure zone 
between two clear terms, as in the hylomorphic schema; 
besides, the hylomorphic schema is itself present in the 
concept of adaptation: the living being finds forms in the 
world that structure the living being; the living being, on the 
other hand, gives form to the world so as to appropriate it: 
adaptation (passive and active) is understood as a recip-
rocal and complex influence on the basis of the hylomorphic 
schema.25
25 Simondon, L’individuation et sa genèse physico-biologique, 207–8, and 
L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 209–10.
28 Here it is Simondon’s anti-substantialism that sustains the 
critique. If life is an individuation or a perpetual genesis, then 
“growth is not a separate process: it is the model for all vital 
processes. . . . All functions of the living being are to some extent 
ontogenetic, not only because they assure adaptation to an exter-
nal world, but because they participate in the permanent individ-
uation of life.”26 The biological concept of adaptation is based 
on a subtle and concealed substantialism which Simondon, with 
reference to the great philosophical tradition deriving from Aris-
totle, calls “hylomorphism”: “biologism of adaptation” is based on 
the idea of an encounter between an already given individual and 
an already given environment, each of which sometimes takes the 
role of “form” and sometimes “matter.” But nothing is given and, 
moreover, genesis extends even beyond adaptation, as we see 
with the living being that has become psycho­social, which rebels 
rather than adapts itself.27
From which we understand that, once again, Simondon thinks of 
life as a becoming by virtue of which “the psychic is, in this sense, 
vital.”28 He summarizes his remarks with the following formula: 
“individuation is anterior to adaptation, and is not exhausted in 
it.”29 When, therefore, he insists on the fact that the biologism 
26 Simondon, L’individuation et sa genèse physico-biologique, 207, and L’individ-
uation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 209.
27 In a “Supplementary Note” to L’individuation à la lumière des notions de 
forme et d’information, Simondon aligns the difference between revolt and 
adaptation and the difference between the living being and the machine—
which can adapt itself, but not revolt.
28 Simondon, L’individuation et sa genèse physico-biologique, 207, and L’individ-
uation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 209.
29 Simondon, L’individuation et sa genèse physico-biologique, 207 and L’individ-
uation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 209. It is possible to 
speak here, with Alain Prochiantz on this occasion, of an “adaptation through 
individuation” (my emphasis), which would “culminate with the human 
brain and the invention of culture and language, which are unbelievable 
instruments of individuation thanks to the significance they have for social 
interactions in the construction of individuals” (Alain Prochiantz, Machine-
esprit, 166–67). 
29of adaptation is “a biologism without ontogenesis,” he does not 
berate it for forgetting the conditions of adaptation that would 
be less than adaptation, but for reducing an activity of the living 
being that is more than adaptation to adaptation. Because it is 
through actions and behavior that the living being develops, and this 
activity which forms the individual instead of presupposing it is 
already more than adaptation.
Simondon clarifies a little later:
In Lamarck, as in Darwin, we find the notion that the object 
is an object for the living being, an object that is constituted 
and detached, representing a danger, a foodstuff or a 
sanctuary. In the theory of evolution, the world in relation 
to which perception takes place is a world that is already 
structured according to a system of unitary and objective 
references. But it is precisely this objective conception of the 
milieu that distorts the concept of adaptation. There is not 
only an object as foodstuff or quarry, but a world defined by 
the search for food and a world defined by the avoidance of 
predators, or a world defined by sexuality. . . . The very con-
cept of milieu is misleading: there is only a milieu for a living 
being which is able to integrate the perceptive worlds into 
a unity of actions. The sensory universe is not immediately 
given: there are only sensory worlds awaiting action in order 
to become significant. Adaptation creates the milieu and the 
being in relation to the milieu, the paths of the being; before 
action, there are no paths, no unified universe.30
Here Lamarck is also criticized, and we sense again, moreover, 
what will be explicitly confirmed later in the text: Simondon 
purposely mixes the two problematics of adaptation and behavior, 
because a thinking of life as becoming must be able simulta-
neously to think a radical genesis and an integration of complex 
30 Simondon, L’individuation et sa genèse physico-biologique, 210–11, and 
L’individuation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 212–13.
30 behaviors, to the extent that they still belong to the sphere of the 
living. The concept of adaptation that he criticizes as insufficient 
in order to think the living being designates a reaction behavior, 
where “passivity”—as reaction—is at the same time an activity 
with respect to the “adaptation” that the theory of evolution refers 
to as “fitness,” which does not relate to behavior. Indeed, the cited 
passage continues with a critique of Kurt Lewin’s psychology, 
since this psychology is based on the biological paradigm of 
adaptation. Elsewhere, Simondon relates embryogenesis to psy-
chologist Arnold Gesell’s “ontogenesis of behavior.” We should 
note here that the very importance of the paradigm of adaptation 
in the human sciences has strengthened the reciprocal ambition in 
Simondon to think the living in such a way that complex behav-
iors can be accounted for.
This gesture is comparable in every respect to Erwin Schröd-
inger’s in Mind and Matter (also in 1958), where he maintains that 
“Lamarckism is untenable,” and at the same time rejects the 
“gloomy aspect of passivity apparently offered by Darwinism”:31
Without changing anything in the basic assumptions of 
Darwinism, we can see that the behavior of the individ-
ual, the way it makes use of its innate faculties, plays the 
most relevant part in evolution. . . . By possessing a new or 
changed character the individual may be caused to change 
its environment—either by actually transforming it, or 
by migration—or it may be caused to change its behavior 
towards its environment, all this in a fashion so as strongly 
to reinforce the usefulness of the new character and thus 
to speed up its further selective improvement in the same 
direction. . . . We must try to understand in a general way, 
and to formulate in a non-animistic fashion, how a chance-
mutation, which gives the individual a certain advantage and 
favors its survival in a given environment, should tend to do 
31 Erwin Schrödinger, Mind and Matter, in What is Life? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), 107.
31more than that, namely to increase the opportunities for its 
being profitably made use of, so as to concentrate on itself, 
as it were, the selective influence of the environment.32
The perspectives put forward here, however, have no chance of 
shaking neo-Darwinian theory if they are not accompanied by an 
attempt to theorize anew that reality which we now know con-
stitutes the fragile ground—fragile because it has not yet been 
thought in a sufficiently complex way—of molecular biology: the 
reality we call “information.”33 As long as this reality has not been 
properly reconsidered, the fragility of its current conception will 
not be enough to truly weaken neo-Darwinism. But, contrary to 
Schrödinger, whose work What is Life34 was one of the sources for 
the informational paradigm of molecular biology as a reductionist 
theory of the “program,” Simondon set about a timely and 
advanced critical interrogation of this Information Theory which, 
32 Schrödinger, Mind and Matter, 107–10.
33 Among other things, the fact that the reality we call “information” is only 
applicable to the living being if it is rethought beyond the framework of its 
current theorization, was recalled by Michel Morange in a review article: 
“Some people have taken this notion of genetic information literally, tried to 
determine it quantitatively and to compare it to the quantity of information 
necessary for the creation of different living forms. This approach has a 
double weakness. The first is to imagine that genes, the genome, would by 
themselves be capable of allowing for the production of living organisms. . . . 
The second weakness of the notion of genetic information is that it describes 
badly the fundamental relationship connecting the sequence of nucleotides 
of DNA with the protein structure. . . . So we see how badly chosen the term 
information is for designating the role of genes and DNA, and how much 
better the term memory suits. . . . A second term taken from the field of 
information and used in biology also calls for analysis and criticism: the term 
program. Following François Jacob in La Logique du vivant, many biologists 
have used the term program to designate the action of genes in the devel-
opment of living organisms. . . . This is to forget the hierarchical organization 
of the living being. Embryonic development can only be understood at the 
level of cells, tissues and organs. A uniquely genetic or molecular description 
of genetic development is impossible” (“Information,” in Dictionnaire d’his-
toire et philosophie des sciences, ed. Dominique Lecourt [Paris: PUF, 2003], 
526–27). 
34 Schrödinger, What is Life? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
32 a few years later, would come to sustain, via cybernetics and 
computer science, the “program” paradigm used in molecular 
biology. Of course, the creative power that may be demanded of 
such a critical questioning is not fully deployed by Simondon. But 
one may at least hope that it exists in his work as an as yet unre-
alized potential of his thought.
Information and Organization
We have seen that Simondon would like to think the living being 
as capable of integrating a psycho-social reality that cannot be 
reduced to the obscure laws of the survival of the species. In the 
same way, but without yet being able to interrogate the impor-
tation of an informational paradigm into biology—which had not 
yet taken place in 1958—he developed a critique of Information 
Theory as a quantitative theory specifically detached from the 
objective, which was unavoidable in his opinion, of accounting for 
experiences of meaning: as experiences, they are characteristic of 
the living being itself in its (inextricably affective-perceptive-motor) 
relations with its milieu. So, the signification of information is both 
what connects the living being to its psycho­social becoming, 
and what is left unthought by Information Theory.35 Which brings 
Simondon to the following critique:
Information theory is constructed to . . . allow a correlation 
between emitter and receiver in cases where this correlation 
has to exist; but if one plans to transpose it directly into the 
psychological and sociological spheres, it is paradoxical: 
the narrower the correlation between emitter and receiver, 
the lower the quantity of information. So, for example, in a 
fully completed apprenticeship, the operator needs only a 
very small quantity of information from the emitter, which 
is to say, from the object he is working on or the machine 
35 On this last point, see Henri Atlan’s now classic account in L’organisation 
biologique et la théorie de l’information (Paris: Hermann, 1972).
33he is operating. The best form, therefore, would be that 
which demands the lowest quantity of information. There is 
something here that does not seem possible.36
After having made reference to Norbert Wiener37 in order to take 
up the new idea of thinking information as negentropic (an idea 
proposed by Léon Brillouin as early as 1956),38 Simondon here 
declares his dissatisfaction. Ultimately, we would say that from 
his perspective the purely technical objectives of Information 
Theory tend, when the intention is to think the living being on 
the basis of this theory, to produce a mysterious break between 
the psychic and the biological, because Information Theory does 
not seek to account for signification. Such, in any case, would be 
Simondon’s response to Henri Atlan’s 1972 criticism of Olivier 
Costa’s desire to think, beyond the self-limitation of Information 
Theory, “the enmeshing of psyche and matter.”39 Simondon too 
would like to be able to think the living being as a psycho­somatic 
relation, making use, for this purpose, of the non-technical 
objectives of the Theory of Form—which is indeed a theory of 
36 L’individuation psychique et collective, 51, and L’individuation à la lumière des 
notions de forme et d’information, 542 (author’s emphasis). This text dates 
from 1960 and not 1958: it comes from the February 1960 conference of the 
Société Française de Philosophie, and, though it postdates it, was integrated 
into the published edition of Simondon’s principal thesis. It is a better 
formulation of Simondon’s refusal to reduce information to the probability 
schema of negentropy. For a technical analysis of this question, see my 
Penser l’individuation. Simondon et la philosophie de la nature, 116–30.
37 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1948), and The Use 
of Human Beings: Cybernetic and Society (Boston: Da Capo Press, 1988). To 
a greater degree than Marxism, this second text is the true interlocutor of 
Du mode d’existence des objets techniques, while the first of these works by 
Wiener is only one of the major interlocutors of L’individuation à la lumière 
des notions de forme et d’information.
38 Léon Brillouin, Science and Information Theory (New York: Academic Press, 
1956).
39 On this point, see Atlan, L’organisation biologique et la théorie de l’information 
(Paris: Hermann, 1972), 196–200.
34 perception rather than of transmission, and which should apply 
even to the psycho­social.40
But today, Henri Atlan is in agreement with Simondon. Indeed, in 
Le vivant post-génomique [The Post­Genomic Living Being], after 
having remarked that “Simondon anticipated in this way the role 
of interference—‘a certain margin of indeterminacy . . . which 
allows the machine to be sensitive to exterior information’—in 
both natural and artificial auto­organization,”41 Atlan emphasizes 
the “inadequacies” of “Shannon’s information theory”: “on the 
one hand, its purely probabilistic nature which is seemingly 
ignorant of any question of signification, and on the other, the 
impossibility of information creation.”42 In decisively Simondonian 
style, Atlan then writes that “the ‘genetic,’ in the original sense of 
the term [i.e. genesis], is not in the ‘gene.’”43 The only remaining 
difference between Atlan and Simondon is that where the latter 
intends to rethink information, which had been too unilaterally 
probabilistic in Shannon, Atlan subsumes information as defined 
by Shannon into a more complex reality he calls “organization”:
There are implicit attributes in the idea of organization, 
which are opposed to each other in the way favored by the 
particular author. Indeed, on the one hand, we find complex-
ity in the sense of unpredictability, variety, diversity, wealth 
of possibilities (of regulation and adaptation); the probabilis-
tic function—Shannon’s quantity of H information—may, in 
certain conditions, be a measure of this. But, on the hand, we 
40 Reciprocally, Simondon rebukes the Theory of Form for not distinguishing 
the whole [ensemble] and the system [système], which is to say, for not 
thinking the metastability specific to the system. And this time he leans on 
Information Theory. On this game between the Theory of Form and Infor-
mation Theory in Simondon, see my Simondon ou l’Encyclopédisme génétique, 
70–71.
41 Atlan, Le vivant post-génomique, 24. Atlan’s quotation of Simondon is taken 
from Du mode d’existence des objets techniques, 11.
42 Atlan, Le vivant post-génomique, 33.
43 Ibid., 55.
35also find here attributes of order, regularity, repetition and 
internal constraints.44
This description by Atlan of the two aspects of organization 
echoes Simondon’s description of the two aspects he saw in infor-
mation itself:
Information is, in one sense, something that can be infinitely 
varied, and something that requires, in order to be trans-
mitted with minimal loss, that energy efficiency be sacrificed 
so as not to reduce in any way the range of possibilities. . . . 
But information, in another sense, is something that, in order 
to be transmitted, must be above the level of phenomena 
of pure chance, like white noise and thermal disturbance; 
so, information is something that has regularity, location, a 
defined sphere and a determined stereotypy by which it is 
distinguished from pure chance. . . . This opposition rep-
resents a technical antinomy which poses a problem for 
philosophical thought: information is like the chance event, 
and yet it is distinguished from it. An absolute stereotypy, 
excluding all novelty, also excludes all information. Yet, the 
distinction between information and interference is based 
on the reduction of the limits of indeterminacy.45
We see from this that what Simondon called “information,” as 
distinguished from Shannonian information, corresponds with 
what Atlan calls “organization”—saying that it is irreducible 
to information… So, now we come to look at the way in which 
Simondon initiates a new theorization of information. Briefly put, 
his two major convictions, which will drive his effort to construct 
a systemic and not cybernetic46 concept of information, are the 
following:
44 Ibid., 69–70.
45 Simondon, Du mode d’existence des objets techniques, 234–36.
46 On this distinction, see my Simondon ou l’Encyclopédisme génétique, 72–73. 
Even if thermodynamics, via the concepts of entropy and negentropy, has 
become a reference for thinkers of information, it should be recalled that 
36 – The fundamental condition for there to be information is not 
a particular state of the emitter, nor is it a property of the 
message, but a particular state of the receiver, which Simondon 
qualifies as “metastable” because it is charged with potentiality 
so as to make becoming-informed possible.
– This information as the transmission of the message is nothing 
but a perpetuated genesis of the receiver—because all infor-
mation is genesis—and there is a “first information” in which 
emitter and receiver do not yet exist. The condition of possibil-
ity here is a first metastability which is picked up by the infor-
mation receiver when information is message transmission.
Because of these two convictions, which make message trans-
mission a particular instance of information, it is a matter, for 
Simondon, of thinking a universal process of information, with 
this latter in fact being the “formula of individuation.”47 From the 
formation of a crystal to the signification experienced by the tran-
sindividuated personality, and by way of genetic information and 
organic perception, we are dealing with different “phases” of the 
same process of information, understood as genesis or individua-
tion, with these different phases able to coexist in a multi-phased 
individual. But one last hypothesis, explicitly presented as such 
by Simondon, but from early on and repeatedly—making it in 
some respects foundational—says that vital individuation is only 
the continuation of an initial inchoate phase of physical individ-
uation. In other words, the relation between vital individuation 
information theoreticians and cyberneticians (as suggested by Bertalanffy, 
so as to distinguish himself from them, in his General System Theory [New 
York: George Braziller, 1968]) did not in the first place draw on thermody-
namics, which on the contrary inspired systems theory—which did not 
however make use of the idea of entropy, but of “metastability” (Simondon) 
as “a dynamic interaction of components” (Bertalanffy). Those we refer to as 
theoreticians of “complexity,” like Simondon in philosophy or Henri Atlan in 
science, are in this way closer to systems theory than to cybernetics, whose 
paradigms are essentially to be found in technology rather than contempo-
rary physics.
47 Simondon, L’individuation et sa genèse physico-biologique, 29, and L’individ-
uation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 31.
37and physical individuation would be a neotenic relation. The inter-
est of this hypothesis is certainly that, for all that, it enables the 
radical thinking of genesis to avoid falling back into a reduction 
of the living to the physical: here, the living, being individuated 
like the physical, has its origin in a “pre­individual” reality which is 
qualified by Simondon as “pre­physical and pre­vital.”
Apoptosis and Permanent Ontogenesis
What, in conclusion, are the possible links between Simondon’s 
perspectives and Jean­Claude Ameisen’s work on apoptosis? Let 
us recall first of all that in La sculpture du vivant [The Sculpting 
of the Living Being] Ameisen argues that apoptosis or “cellular 
suicide” participates in the ontogenetic process itself. In Simondon 
ou L’Encyclopédisme génétique, I believed it possible to say that 
a first link between La sculpture du vivant and L’individuation à la 
lumière des notions de forme et d’information could be found in this 
idea of death’s constitutive role in life itself, because Simondon 
had distinguished between death which “translates the very 
instability of individuation, its confrontation with the conditions of 
the world,” and death which “does not come from the confrontation 
with the world, but from the convergence of internal transfor-
mations.”48 He clarified:
for the living being, death exists in two forms which do not 
coincide: it is adverse death . . . . But death also exists for 
the individual in another sense: the individual is not pure 
interiority: it grows heavy with the residual weight of its 
operations; it is passive in itself; it is its own exteriority . . . . 
In this sense, it seems that the fact that the individual is not 
eternal need not be considered accidental; the whole of life 
can be considered as a transductive series; death as the 
final event is only the consummation of a deadening process 
48 Simondon, L’individuation et sa genèse physico-biologique, 213, and L’individ-
uation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 215 (my emphasis).
38 that accompanies every vital operation as an operation of 
individuation; each operation of individuation leaves death 
in the individuated being which is progressively loaded with 
something that it cannot eliminate; this deadening differs 
from the degradation of organs; it is essential to the activity 
of individuation.49
In my brief commentary of this passage, I added that, without 
seeing here a strict anticipation of the thesis of apoptosis as 
the very condition of life, one should at least recognize that 
Simondon integrates death into the process of life as permanent 
individuation. I would like to clarify here both the meaning and 
the limits of this possible parallel between Simondon’s hypo-
thetical speculations and the most recent advances of cellular 
biology and immunology. It will appear that even if Simondon does 
not think apoptosis, there is at least the intuition of a new theory of 
aging according to which the latter is not only wear and tear, but also 
points to the constitutive role of death for life, which is thought today 
by Ameisen via the link between “death before the fact” and repro-
duction. This intuition of Simondon’s on the subject of aging is in 
evidence in this statement from the center of the cited passage: 
“death as the final event is only the consummation of a deadening 
process that accompanies every vital operation as an operation 
of individuation.” But this is only an intuition with all its inherent 
limitations, which will come to light in a brief analysis. Let us see 
how things stand.
The distinction between death as terminus and death as an inter-
nal condition is explicit in Simondon’s passage in the distinction 
between “wear and tear” and “deadening,” a distinction which, at 
first sight, is that much more obscure since Simondon explains 
the aging phenomenon by way of the second, and it is difficult 
to understand—still at first sight—how it would not be based 
on the first. Only the notion of a “sediment,” articulated here by 
49 Simondon, L’individuation et sa genèse physico-biologique, 213, and L’individ-
uation à la lumière des notions de forme et d’information, 215.
39Simondon via the words “each operation of individuation leaves 
death in the individuated being”, allows us to distinguish at a 
push between wear and tear and deadening, but this notion is not 
on its own what will truly enable us to make death into a process 
conditioning life: in order for the notion of a sediment to itself 
contribute to making deadening something “essential to the activ-
ity of individuation,” as Simondon says when he distinguishes it 
from wear and tear, the sediment cannot be a simple sediment. 
Now, it is precisely with respect to the phenomenon of aging that 
Ameisen allows Simondon’s hypothetical and still simply intuitive 
speculations to take on their full meaning—through an extension/
overturning of the notion of a sediment:
Aging and death may not only result from wear and tear, 
from the passage of time and the body’s inability to with-
stand the assaults of the environment. . . . A protein [issuing 
from the Methuselah gene], a minimum production of which 
is essential to the construction of the embryonic body [of 
the fruit fly], also has the effect of shortening the lifespan of 
adults when it is produced—beyond this minimum thresh-
old—in a ‘normal,’ which is to say, excessive quantity. A 
minimal production of the Methuselah protein favors individ-
ual longevity, but risks compromising fecundity; an excessive 
production favors premature aging but brings a margin of 
security to the propagation of the species.50
Simondon had made reproduction “pre-eminent amongst trans-
ductions,” which is to say, the radical form of vital individuation, 
and he had also intuited that aging does not proceed only from 
wear and tear. But, because he did not have at his disposal this 
notion of an intrinsic constitutive role of death for life provided by 
the new theorization of apoptosis, he did not bind reproduction 
to death except in the classic and so to speak metaphoric form of 
the extension of self to the after­self. It remains the case that, to 
the same extent that apoptosis properly speaking is not at stake 
50 Jean-Claude Ameisen, La Sculpture du vivant (Paris: Seuil, 2003), 374 and 384.
40 in the new theory of aging put forward by Ameisen, it is possible 
to maintain that Simondon, at the level of the intuitions that 
motivated him, would have been perfectly in accord with these 
words from the biologist, dedicated this time to “splitting” and 
cellular aging:
Each time that the mother-cell splits its genetic library before 
generating, it also splits, on the basis of its chromosomes, 
little supernumerary copies of circular DNA. And it keeps 
these copies, which are not allotted to the daughter-cell, in 
itself. As the mother­cell continues to give birth, its body con-
tains an ever increasing number of copies. The accumulation 
of these little DNA circles above a certain threshold seems to 
trigger the fragmentation of the nucleus of the mother-cell 
and its death. . . . The idea is that life’s victory over wear and 
tear is bound to a local heightening of disorganization—of 
the advance towards disorder—in one part (the mother­cell) 
which enables the birth in another part (the daughter-cell), of 
a discrete, local level of order and complexity. The passing of 
a maternal body is accelerated to enable the birth and sur-
vival of an infant body.51
So we come in conclusion to the second of the two links between 
Simondon and Ameisen. That is to say, to the idea, introduced by 
Ameisen at the end of La sculpture du vivant, according to which 
dramatic changes in the environment can bring to light, in 
a body that is developing itself, a pre­existent source of 
novelty—a potentiality—which had accumulated progres-
sively over time and which, continually repressed until now, 
is suddenly able to show itself for the first time. In this way, 
the external environment has the power to sculpt the living 
being.52 
I will give two successive readings of these words:
51 Ibid., 416–17.
52 Ibid., 409.
41a. Even if Ameisen does not say as much—we will see why in the 
second reading—the process he describes corresponds, at least 
in the first instance, to what Stephan Jay Gould called “exaptation,” 
and which Pierre Sonigo, in a commentary on the latter, dis-
tinguished from the idea of “programmed anticipation” suggested 
by the Darwinian term “pre­adaptation”: “evolutionary innova-
tion is brought about by unexpected encounters between the 
potential and the useful.”53
Whatever the case may be, the schema proposed by Ameisen of 
a revelation, through the agency of the dramatically altered envi-
ronment, of a potentiality that has been progressively accumu-
lated in the organism, aims explicitly to mediate, and ultimately 
go beyond (in agreement, I would add, with Gould’s point of view), 
the opposition between the “gradualists” and the “punctualists,” 
which is to say, between the conception of evolution in terms of 
negligible genetic modifications and the conception of evolution 
in terms of “leaps ahead” or sudden jumps. This mediation and 
this move beyond oppositions would have appealed to Simondon 
who himself sought systematically to subvert naïve alternatives 
and who, in Du mode d’existence des objets techniques, had in the 
same way associated continuity and discontinuity in order to 
think the becoming of the technical object. In the thinking of the 
living being, the way in which Ameisen pays particular attention 
to the question of as yet unrealized potential seems to be truly 
Simondonian, as does the possibility of formulating anew a con-
cept on which Simondon was particularly reliant: the Bernardian 
concept of “interior milieu,” which indeed Ameisen seems to 
revisit and which is not antithetical to his thesis according to 
which “the environment is more than a simple filter—a bot-
tleneck—through which individuals and species are selected or 
eliminated. The exterior environment can exert a direct influence 
53 Pierre Sonigo and Isabelle Stengers, L’évolution (Paris: EPD Sciences, 2003), 
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42 on the way in which cells and bodies use their genetic potential-
ities and so on the manner in which embryos are constructed.”54
b. The way in which Ameisen establishes this last idea would 
have further appealed to Simondon since the biologist intends to 
differentiate himself from Gould here (who, moreover, Ameisen 
places on the side of the punctualists), to the extent that for 
Gould, as for the (opposed) positions of gradualism and punc-
tualism, the “emergence of individuals and species endowed with 
new properties is considered to be an immediate translation, 
a direct consequence in real time, of the appearance of chance 
modifications in their genes . . . . In other words, the essential 
debate between these two theories does not concern the way in 
which the environment sculpts the new aspect, but the nature 
of the modifications on which it brings its effects to bear.”55 In 
opposition to this common point of view, which had underpinned 
the debate up to now, Ameisen suggests developing the con-
sequences of the work of Linquist and Rutherford, which he 
expounds as follows:
When the embryos of fruit flies undergo a thermal shock, 
the new­borns exhibit profound modifications in a whole 
range of organs—antennae, wings, eyes, legs. These mod-
ifications vary from one embryo to another and from one 
sub­species of fruit fly to another. The appearance of this 
new aspect is not connected to the sudden appearance of 
genetic modifications: it is due to the revelation of a pre­exis-
tent genetic diversity, whose appearance had until now been 
permanently repressed.56
This “repression” is performed by proteins which are called 
“chaperones” and which attach themselves to modified pro-
teins, “allowing them to return to their initial form.”57 And so 




43it is necessary to give a second reading of the above citation 
from Ameisen in which it was said that “dramatic changes in 
the environment can bring to light, in a body that is developing 
itself, a pre­existent source of novelty—a potentiality—which 
had accumulated progressively over time and which, continually 
repressed until now, is suddenly able to show itself for the first 
time.” The words I have italicized contain the theoretical innova-
tion which means that it is no longer necessary for Ameisen to 
refer to Gould’s exaptation: here, the action of the new environ-
ment, which suddenly reveals potentialities accumulated in the 
organism, no longer operates on the form of the proteins—so on 
the gene’s mode of expression—but on the internal agents which 
until now restored this form when it had been altered in this 
way. This is the “complexity” explicitly claimed by Ameisen, and 
“complexity” is the watchword whose great pioneer, as I showed 
in Simondon ou l’Encyclopédisme génétique, is without doubt 
Simondon. So we have our work cut out for us.
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